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The Practice of Principle:
In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory
Jules L. Coleman
New York: Oxford University Press, 2001 (226 pp)

Reviewed by Robbie Mosert

In this densely-packed book 1 purporting to cover all significant areas of
contemporary jurisprudence, the author's goal seems to be twofold:
First, he seeks to cast doubt on the popular Dworkinian wisdom that the
project of explaining the law is conceptually tied up with the project of
justifying it. Second, by employing a novel version of conceptual
analysis, he aims to advance a "pragmatic" account of the central
concepts in jurisprudence.
The book is comprised of twelve chapters, or 'Lectures', each of
which was presented in lesser or different form at Oxford University in
1998 as part of the Clarendon Lectures in Law series at which the author
defended his version of inclusive legal positivism. The first move in the
book is an application of the pragmatic method to tort law, and
Coleman's target is any purported 'economic analysis' of law. The
author's claim is that economic analyses misconstrue important parts of
legal practice by treating law as a matter of efficiency. Indeed, a pragmatic conceptual analysis of to1i law reveals, on the contrary, that torts
are best understood as embodying a principle of corrective justice,
whose moral ideal is independent of its role in explaining tort law. Next,
the author goes on to argue that the law's nonnativity (its claim to
authority) can be explained in terms of its giving us reasons for action
that can be fmther specified by the notion of 'shared cooperative actions'. Last, Coleman defends his theory against several alternative
accounts of the goals of jurisprudence. As he sees it, the overall project
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of jurisprudence is to identify "normatively significant" components of
legal practice by explaining them as the embodiment of principle.
Coleman puts his pragmatic conceptual analysis to work on tort law.
On his analysis, tort law embodies or makes explicit the principle of
corrective justice inasmuch as the principle identifies specific pieces of
the practice as "normatively significant". The central concepts of tort
law - harm, cause, repair, fault, etc. - construct a web of inferential
relations that articulate corrective justice and define its requirements. As
Coleman sees it, economic analysis gives rise to various "functionbased" economic explanations of tort law, all of which fail to adequately
or consistently describe a working jurisprudence. According to economic analysis, the function of law is to optimally reduce accident costs.
How well the law does this depends on a) the degree to which it reduces
the cost of accidents, and b) the cost of its doing so. Coleman's complaint is that concepts like negligence that conceptually accompany tort
law have been reduced to the economic terms of cost and risk. It follows,
then, that if tort law were practiced the way the economist describes it,
plaintiffs would gather evidence not to the effect that there is a failure to
comply with a duty, but rather to the effect that the defendant will absorb
the least costs. But our actual practices suggest that "the wrongfulness
of the act, the fact of the hann, and the causal relation between the two
are all pertinent to the outcome of the lawsuit."2
In the end, Coleman undertakes a rigorous examination of economist claims and concludes that no economic analysis has successfully
argued a) that the outcome of torts really is efficient cost reduction, nor
b) that a causal story exists which can use this purported outcome to
explain the very structure and existence of tort law. Without either of
these arguments in place, Coleman worries further whether 'efficiency'
as the function of torts is even morally desirable in (roughly) a justiceas-fairness sense; that is, a sense that is pai1 of our "pretheoretic"
conceptions about tort law. 3 Coleman's view is that a non-reductive
theory can better explain these concerns by showing how the law figures
in the wide-ranging context of our moral and social practices. A certain
principle (corrective justice) is "embodied" by the practices that constitute tort law, and in turn, tort law is explained by this principle.
2

3

Ibid at 20.
Ibid. at 32, 15.
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Coleman's account of tort law results in an innovative understanding of the nature of legal systems since it commits him to an innovative
understanding of the positivist rule of recognition. In the remainder of
the book, Coleman advances this understanding against the arguments
of both exclusive legal positivists like Joseph Raz and quasi-naturalists
like Ronald Dworkin. 4 To discharge the book's promise to offer a full
jurisprudential theory, Coleman must defend a conception of law's
conventionality and authority, a rival to the accounts of these concepts
as advanced by Raz and Dworkin.
Through forceful, and at times repetitive argument, Coleman asserts
that the conventionally accepted criteria of legality can be (and in fact
are) expressed by a rule (the rule of recognition) that imposes an
obligation on officials to evaluate cases only according to those norms
that satisfy the made-explicit criteria. 5 Coleman maintains, with H.L.A.
Hart, that the very possibility oflaw is to be explained in terms of social
facts, and the possibility of legal authority is to be explained in terms of
a convention, namely, an adherence to a rule of recognition. As
Coleman sees it, his reading of this 'conventionality thesis' avoids
reducing legal authority to social facts, by themselves devoid of any
explanation oflaw's normativity, and instead explains legal authority in
terms of normative social practices. The virtue of this shift is that it
allows Coleman to capture the normativity essential to legal authority.
Utilizing contemporary Wittgensteinian views on the possibility of
rule-following, Coleman advances his notion of 'principle embodied by
practice' as a way of making intelligible the claim that officials in a legal
system adhere to the rule of recognition through their convergent
behaviour. Generally, if the same rule is being followed by two or more
officials, then they must share a grasp of the rule that is reflected both in
convergent behaviour and in broadly shared grasps of the rule's application. They must share what Coleman calls a "framework of interaction. "6 Relating this notion of rule-following back to the 'internal point
of view' that Hart used to explain convergent behaviour, Coleman
purports to explain both how the rule of recognition exists and how it

Natural law jurisprudence is mentioned only in passing, amid concerns of whether morality
can figure in the content of a legal system.
5 Coleman, supra note lat 72.
6 Coleman, supra note lat 82.
4
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provides governance. Further, an individual taking the internal point of
view toward a rule is provided a reason for action distinct from and in
addition to the reason a person already has for obeying that rule, namely,
by turning habitual behaviour into a rule.
A worry surfaces here that a person may unilaterally extinguish a
rule as such in a way that she may not extinguish a duty imposed by a
law. If this is true, Coleman's argument for the role of the internal point
of view does not do the necessary work for explaining the possibility of
legal authority. Coleman wrestles with this problem, 7 (which he attributes to social theory and not to jurisprudence) and in so doing, he
imports the notion of a shared cooperative activity (scA). 8 A SCA is an
activity that involves participation with a shared intention converging
on a common goal. Still, Coleman wonders whether he may have just
offered an account of an extra reason to obey a law without unpacking
the notion of duty in a way illuminated by the rule of recognition. He
does not think, however, that his theory stands or falls with this claim.
Having argued that legal authority is to be explained in terms of social
conventions, Coleman fleshes out whether or not an inclusive rule of
recognition, that is, a rule of recognition that includes moral norms as
criteria of legality, is consistent with his model, or, indeed with any
model, of law's authority. After some analysis and consideration of
opponents' claims, Coleman concludes that what is conceptually true of
law per se need not be true of every individual law, leaving his account
of authority open to criticism on this point.
In the latter part of the book, 9 Coleman takes up a defence of his
method of conceptual analysis, one which he believes he shares in spirit
with H.L.A. Hart, and in method, broadly conceived, with W.V. Quine.
This lively and thoughtful account of analyticity-skepticism and pragmatism provides a pleasant and helpful way to close and to collect one's
thoughts around Coleman's. Arguments advanced by Ronald Dworkin
as well as contemporary exclusive legal positivists are responded to in
turn, and it is at least a virtue of Coleman's thought that he strives for
consistency in his method and manner of replies.

7
8
9

Coleman, supra note I at 92-93.
Coleman, supra note I at 96.
Coleman, supra note I at 151.
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The book is not written for the beginner in legal theory; it presup
poses at least an intermediate familiarity with concepts in the philoso
phy of law. Since a good deal of the argument rests on post-Quinear
epistemology, it also helps to have a general understanding of
in contemporary philosophy of language and theory of knowledge. Tht:
interested reader can set these details aside, however, and still be
impressed by Coleman's original and lucid account of the
between corrective justice, legal authority and normativity, and of the
role of moral concepts in legal discourse.

